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The increased presence of international humani-
tarian actors in the last few decades has fostered a 
renewed interest in non-governmental organisations 
and their roles both now and in the past, whether this 
be urgent interventions for the relief of populations 
afflicted by disasters either natural or derived from 
human action –if this distinction still has any sense 
in the context of a “risk society” (Beck 1992)– or the 
defence of human rights. This circumstance has con-
tributed to the renewal of historical studies on hu-
manitarianism in general and, more specifically, on 
war humanitarianism, including the international Red 
Cross movement, such that a change in the direction 
of the historiography has taken place.
Historical attention paid to the Red Cross has been 
notable from the very birth of the “International As-
sociation of aid societies for the relief of the military 
sick and wounded in the field” (1863) and the signing 
of the Geneva Convention of 1864. There are a great 
deal of more-or-less official histories that have pro-
fusely documented the development and activities of 
the Geneva Committee – the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and of different national 
Red Cross societies as well as biographical studies de-
voted to the founding fathers of the movement and 
to some of its earliest promoters. Yet, some of these 
histories written during the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century, and most of those written in the 
twentieth century, were intended to construct and 
nourish a genealogy of the organisation and of its ac-
tors’ involvement in order to legitimise, particularly in 
crucial moments of its history, the deployment of its 
increasingly numerous and varied interventions, by 
justifying at once its own trajectory and vicissitudes.
However, a new wave of historical studies in the 
two last decades –doubtless spurred on by John F. 
Hutchinson’s monograph (1996)– is outlining new 
goals in the history of this movement by framing 
it in the socio-political and scientific context of the 
nineteenth-century Industrial Revolution and of the 
conflicts provoked by the colonial expansion of the 
European powers, as well as by that of the new pow-
ers then emerging on both sides of the Pacific ocean.1 
More recently, a new generation of scholars has di-
versified and enlarged the purpose of this research so 
that the history of the international movement of the 
Red Cross has begun to be dealt with in a more inte-
grated way. Thus, along with the traditional concern 
for the history of the Geneva Committee and the most 
renowned national societies, new, much more atten-
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tive, research into other national societies and local 
committees has been undertaken. At the same time, 
some of these new studies have also begun to pay 
attention to the mutual influence and relationships 
between the Red Cross movement and other contem-
porary movements or processes, namely, pacifism, 
abolitionism, feminism, militarism, commercial wars, 
international law, and social medicine, among others.
As a result of this, most recent studies of humani-
tarian action in war have illuminated the existence of 
vaster and more varied networks of actors, who have 
deployed a range of humanitarian practices in multiple 
and diverse spaces and spheres of action. Thus, mani-
fold interactions are being incorporated into these new 
analyses, namely those between distinct humanitarian 
actors as well as between different sectors of political 
and social organisations, both in the territories and ar-
eas from which war relief was dispatched and in the 
locations where it was implemented.
It must be also pointed out that these renewed 
efforts take advantage of previous studies both his-
torical and documentary on the Red Cross and of the 
increased opening of institutional archives to their 
inquiries. But these integrated analyses have also 
relied for their complexity upon the enormous pos-
sibilities provided by information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to gain access to the vast wealth of 
printed and manuscript sources the mere location and 
retrieval of which was so difficult until the last dec-
ade of the twentieth century. The 150th anniversary 
of the international movement of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent societies at the biennium 2013-2014 is 
a good occasion to revisit from new angles and with 
renewed approaches and sources some episodes of 
its already long history.
Perhaps, the most remarkable consequence of this 
historiographical change has been to avoid any tele-
ological temptation in interpreting the history of the 
Red Cross. In fact, irrespective of the nature of “mis-
sion” the work of the Red Cross had for its founders 
and initial promoters, its history is the product –like 
that of any similar institution however transcendental 
its purposes might be– of a contingent configuration 
process in which different kinds of interactions play as 
much a determinant role as the values upon which in-
stitutional histories of the movement have tradition-
ally placed such emphasis. In this way, the article by 
Guillermo Sánchez-Martínez, “Enemies by accident, 
neutral on the rebound: diversity and contingency at 
the birth of war humanitarianism, 1862-1864”, open-
ing the dossier, offers a case study which re-examines 
the founding period of the Red Cross, from the publi-
cation of the first edition of Henry Dunant’s Un Souve-
nir de Solférino (Geneva, 1862), to the initial contacts 
(Nov 1863) made for the call to the diplomatic confer-
ence of August 1864. In this article it is shown how 
Dunant’s campaign to promote his idea –to constitute 
permanent societies of relief for wounded soldiers in 
campaign– eventually led to the convocation of an 
international conference; how this conference, that 
gathered a reduced and plurinational group of philan-
thropists and military physicians, many of whom were 
mere observers, developed its proposals without na-
tionalistic partiality; and how it finished by sending 
out an appeal to the charitable and philanthropic zeal 
of European public opinion for the constitution of civil 
aid societies in order to help the armies reduce their 
insufficiencies in relieving their wounded.
This appeal contained an agreed model for these 
societies, namely that in each country a single na-
tional committee should be formed –and from which 
any other committee would depend– and it would of-
fer its services to the national government in order to 
help its military health services in wartime. In peace-
time, each national committee would devote itself to 
the training of voluntary nurses and build up stores of 
health-care material. In wartime, it could ask for help 
from committees of neutral countries, and give aid to 
its own national army, by providing voluntary nurses 
and establishing first-aid posts wherever the army re-
quested. If allowed or required, it would send to the 
battlefield –under the military commander’s order– 
male nurses who were provided with the required 
equipment by the committee, and a white armband 
with a red cross for the purpose of identification. Fi-
nally, in order to coordinate collective action, these 
national committees could participate in interna-
tional conferences and communicate with each other 
through the Geneva Committee.
The fact that most of those involved in sending out 
this appeal were just observers did not prevent them 
from leaving the Conference as propagandists of an 
already in-progress work, committed to introducing it 
in their native countries. In this manner, a simultane-
ous call spread throughout Europe to activate a new 
health-care technology whose practical efficacy soon 
became manifest, so that the 1863 Conference would 
remain for posterity as the origin of the movement 
of national societies of the Red Cross. This health-
care technology was to contribute, with no discussion 
about causes,2 to a remedying of the catastrophes its 
proponents were afraid would derive from interna-
tional wars fought with newly-developed and highly-
destructive armaments.3
Annexed, however, to the final resolutions of the 
1863 Conference were a number of pleas to be taken 
into consideration by governments, namely, that aid 
committees were accepted and their mission made 
easier; that neutrality was proclaimed for their ambu-
lances and hospitals, the official health-care person-
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nel, the voluntary nurses, the civil population who 
relieved the wounded, and the wounded themselves; 
that a single sign was adopted for the military health 
services of all the armies as well as a single flag for 
hospitals and ambulances –the same red cross on a 
white background to be found on the voluntary nurs-
es’ armband.
The unexpected performance of the participants 
at that Conference and the commitments they took 
upon themselves gave rise to the possibility of an 
international agreement to guarantee the immunity 
of the wounded and of the health-care equipment 
for their relief. This led the Conseil Fédéral Suisse 
to invite European governments to debate and sign 
a convention for this purpose. The resulting diplo-
matic congress, held in Geneva in August 1864, and 
calling upon European governments –but not sover-
eigns– concluded with the signature of the Conven-
tion pour l’amélioration du sort des militaires blessés 
en campaigne by twelve states, namely Baden, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Hesse-Darmstadt, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, Württemberg 
and Switzerland itself. In an unprecedented race to be 
the most humanitarian, the Congress settled nothing 
less than neutralisation, while there were wounded, 
of ambulances and hospitals and of all the personnel 
assigned to their care, including managers and chap-
lains, with the guarantee that they could stay caring 
these soldiers and later be accompanied back to the 
advance guard of their army. A number of other guar-
antees followed to this one. First, the equipment of a 
permanent hospital would pass over to an occupying 
army, but that of the ambulances would be exempted. 
Second, the armies would stimulate humanitarian be-
haviour in civilians by guaranteeing them treatment 
as neutrals if they provided health-care relief, by ex-
empting them from lodging troops, and by reducing 
their war taxes if they were in charge of caring for the 
wounded at home. Third, wounded or sick soldiers 
would be cared for with no distinction of country, 
and those having recovered who were invalid would 
be returned home; and still more, the same fortune 
would apply to those recovered and “valid” if they 
promised to surrender their arms, so that all of them 
would be guaranteed immunity during their return 
home, and this could even see an immediate return of 
the wounded if both sides agreed it. Fourth, hospitals, 
ambulances and convoys of wounded would have a 
single flag, and the personnel an armband with a red 
cross on a white background. And fifth, the execution 
of these commitments would fall to the army com-
manders. The elaboration of these principles stands in 
moving contrast to the degrees of cruelty which were 
then, and are nowadays, part of modern war.
Paradoxically, by express decision of the govern-
mental delegates, the signed Convention did not refer 
at all either to civil aid societies or to voluntary nurses. 
However, the mere announcement that this confer-
ence was to be held and the publicity surrounding 
the new Convention –and because it stipulated the 
neutrality of the wounded and their carers, and the 
economic cost of keeping immobilised in peacetime 
such a huge amount of resources was unthinkable– 
meant that these initiatives gradually received the 
corresponding governmental permissions for their im-
plementation, though the actual level of official sup-
port fluctuated from one country to another. Some of 
the most reluctant governments had no choice but to 
accept the existence of these aid societies and to rely 
on their help. Indeed, because care of the wounded 
without distinction of country applied to the coun-
tries that had accorded to the Convention, those not 
having initially signed it ended up doing so as soon as 
they were involved in a new war.4 In sum, the Geneva 
Convention had emerged as a law technology for the 
purpose of health care in war, and its consolidation 
marked the beginning of Humanitarian Law.5 Moreo-
ver, this law technology was to be identified by the 
same banner as the one which identified the provision 
of health-care relief by Red Cross societies.
However, the historical evidence shows that the 
different national aid societies and committees that 
were gradually constituted throughout the subse-
quent years, far from complying with a single pattern 
and assembling as a harmonious movement with a 
homogeneous perspective, emerged –it could not be 
otherwise– greatly conditioned by the values of their 
respective societies. Therefore, there appeared such 
variable versions as the para-governmental Prussian 
society and the Italian “Risorgimento” committees, 
the failed process to induce the United States govern-
ment to sign the Geneva Convention (1866-1870)6, 
and the tutelary introduction of an aid society in Egypt 
(1872).7 It is also obvious that, once both technologies 
were socially implemented, the prevailing humanitar-
ian and scientific cultural habits led those involved in 
relief work in the field to develop multiple approaches 
to specific issues and multiple new solutions in each 
case. The impetus of this new health-care technology 
opened the door to a wider and disseminated search 
for technological solutions to the transportation of 
the wounded over long and short distances. It also 
fostered studies concerned with technical and sani-
tary improvement of premises for provisory or per-
manent lodging, stimulated works on prophylaxis and 
on hygiene and surgical procedures for amputations, 
and so on. 
In the same way, the sanction of the law technol-
ogy –the novelty of a formal compromise that obliged 
all the signatory nations because it was placed over 
them– intensified attempts to redefine the “Law of 
Nations” (ius gentium) in the direction of arbitration 
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and codification as a result of “collective rational ac-
tion”. In scarcely ten years, international law codifi-
cations were proposed, the Geneva Convention was 
modified (with no legal effect), the treaty of Washing-
ton that fixed the conditions by which an arbitration 
was considered valid, was signed, the Institut de Droit 
International and the International Law Association 
were founded, clauses promoting previous treaties, 
such as that of Paris in 1856, to this supranational 
level were introduced, and a conference was held in 
Brussels to define the Laws of War.
In the end, the official sanctioning of both technolo-
gies opened the door to new imperatives to action. 
For instance, once relief for the wounded on the bat-
tlefields had become a pressing concern, aid societies’ 
internal debates over their aims, activities, organisa-
tion and means were accompanied by the rise, beyond 
the movement led from Geneva, of many different ini-
tiatives. This was the case, after Florence Nightingale’s 
early rejection of the “Genevan model”, for the forma-
tion of the British National Society for Aid to the Sick 
and Wounded in War (NAS), a voluntary society for 
relief in war which developed independently of the 
Red Cross international movement until 1905, when it 
became one of the major institutions involved in the 
foundation of the British Red Cross Society (BRCS). 
Rebecca Gill’s article “The origins of the British Red 
Cross Society and the politics and practices of relief 
in war, 1870-1906” is devoted to this history.8 It ex-
amines the controversial origins and practices of the 
NAS on the occasion of its involvement in a number of 
armed conflicts both European (the Franco-Prussian 
war, the Paris Commune, the Carlist war, the Turko-
Serbian war) and colonial (the South African war) dur-
ing the last third of the 19th and first years of the 20th 
centuries. Particular attention is paid to the specifici-
ties of the NAS’ history –and more generally, to the 
foundation of the BRCS–, particularly the concerns 
and aims of their founding members, their close links 
to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem and the British 
army, their disregard of the Geneva Committee, and 
their contribution to the development of first aid as 
a new medical specialty in both war and civil society. 
Last but not least, it is noted how important the biog-
raphies of some of these actors, such as John Furley 
(1836-1919), are to a better understanding of the his-
tory of humanitarianism. In the end, the NAS’ history 
shows that the international movement of the Red 
Cross was by no means the only institutionalisation 
of modern war humanitarianism in late nineteenth-
century Europe, but just the most successful.
Early debates about the NAS are also one of many 
examples available of the differences between what 
aid societies believed they were promoting, what the 
governments thought they were approving in sub-
scribing to the Geneva Convention, and what public 
opinion made of all this.9 In fact, the variety of ambu-
lances –both mobile and permanent– sent from di-
verse countries and committees, by actors of the most 
varied ideological views, to relieve the wounded in the 
Franco-Prussian war, as well as their disparate actions 
on the occasion of the siege during La Commune, made 
obvious that, once the precise terms of the articles of 
the Geneva Convention (1864) and of the resolutions 
of the Conference held one year before had been for-
gotten, there was a widespread social reading that hu-
manitarian volunteers had the right to intervene on the 
battlefield to relieve the wounded. Moreover, it was 
widely assumed that this right was legally enshrined 
in the obligation of the armies at war to respect, and 
to protect, the wounded and their carers. The history 
exposing in parallel the humanitarian operations of all 
these ambulances and the highly notable discrepancy 
between their intentions and values is still to be writ-
ten. The discrepancies between Thomas Longmore and 
Loyd Lindsay at the NAS –exposed by Gill– illustrate 
some of these facets.
These manifold discrepancies provoked a general-
ised reaction by the military commanders –both of 
the executive and of the health services– to uphold 
the fact that voluntary nurses were not mentioned at 
the Geneva Convention, and the subsequent decision, 
taken in the Congrès international sur le service médi-
cal des armées en campagne held in Paris in 1878, 
that voluntary ambulances on the battlefield were 
from now on forbidden. Scarcely fifteen years after 
this door had been opened, the range of socially gen-
erated possibilities pertaining to the granting of aid to 
the wounded in the field was reduced to the option 
of accompanying national armies in their campaigns. 
And from the 1890s these campaigns would take place 
on the occasion of conflicts in the European colonies.
However, the events of this period have become 
part of a “lost decade” attendant upon the absence of 
specific studies concerning the 1880s –roughly speak-
ing–, a period to which general histories of the Red 
Cross have also paid little attention except by referring 
to the revival of international conferences on the oc-
casion of the twentieth anniversary of the movement 
and to the birth of the American Red Cross. There are 
multiple factors contributing to this omission. Among 
them there is the fact that this period was propitious 
neither for elegy nor for the epic genre because of the 
absence of wars in Europe. The fading of the narra-
tive of heroism, abnegation, philanthropy and charity 
which had been to some extent the basis of aid socie-
ties’ appeal, meant that many of them undertook a 
series of more-or-less convincing and unfocused re-
foundations.10
Traditional histories have usually followed suit by 
agreeing that, in the absence of war, aid societies’ 
Asclepio, 66 (1), enero-junio 2014, p027. ISSN-L: 0210-4466. http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/asclepio.2014.01
INTRODUCTION. ON THE 150th ANNIVERSARY OF THE RED CROSS: NEW ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE HISTORY OF WAR HUMANITARIANISM
5
low profile was the correct one. Yet, this issue should 
be tackled not only because the past cannot be dealt 
with as a history of achievement, but also because 
it is necessary to account for the involvement of the 
Red Cross movement in a period in which internation-
al relationships were reshaped, and there arose to 
prominence those who advocated a military doctrine 
which claimed that the best way to make war was to 
minimise suffering by fighting it in the most rapid and 
implacable way –those “philanthropists in their own 
way” as stated by Gustave Moynier.11 The aid societies 
themselves also contributed to the “lost years” of this 
period for they were unable to establish a common 
cause consistent enough to remain active and coordi-
nated in peacetime.
Indeed, although the international movement of 
the Red Cross did not officially begin to expand its rep-
ertoire of action in circumstances beyond its found-
ing aims until after the First World War, debates on 
whether it was appropriate to undertake humani-
tarian interventions in the face of other disasters as 
well as other forms of conflict (uprisings, civil and 
colonial wars) accompanied it from the beginning. As 
exposed by Jon Arrizabalaga and Guillermo Sánchez-
Martínez, in the third of the articles gathered in this 
dossier –“Humanitarian aid in peacetime: conflicting 
narratives in the international Red Cross movement, 
1867-1884”– the recurrent debate concerning aid in 
peacetime combined two entirely different discus-
sions, namely what preparations should be under-
taken in order to be ready in case of war, and whether 
aid societies ought also to be devoted to any useful 
activity beyond these preparations, specifically in the 
face of peacetime disasters of every kind –including 
epidemics, fires, floods, droughts, famines, and min-
ing or railway accidents. This debate –driven from 
outside as well as inside the aid movement– and in 
which the Geneva Committee was always reluctant to 
engage, reached its apogee at the second internation-
al Conference of aid societies for relief of wounded 
soldiers held at Berlin in 1869, in the middle of the po-
litical process of German unification under the aegis 
of Prussia. The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war 
(1870-1871) diverted aid societies’ attention away 
from these discussions to more pressing priorities 
and, when the debate was resumed after the war, it 
was strongly conditioned by the authority of the vic-
torious Prussian army by virtue of the efficacy of its 
model. This authority was also transferred to the or-
ganisation of armies all around the world, including 
countries as far away from Europe as Japan and Chile. 
Yet, further debate was also conditioned by the de-
velopment of new actors and new initiatives in public 
“hygiene” in Europe. From the subsequent debates 
and the contemporary humanitarian practices in 
peacetime undertaken by different national Red Cross 
societies before the third international conference of 
aid societies held in Geneva in 1884, it is clear that 
they gradually converged with contemporary move-
ments concerned with the search for social protec-
tion for the victims of modern industrial hazards; and, 
again, that each national aid society adjusted their 
peacetime activities in a varied way, according to the 
peculiar circumstances and values of their particular 
country, although these activities were always supple-
mentary to their own raison d’être –that of caring for 
the soldiers wounded in campaign.
From what has been said so far, it may be assumed 
that during the 1890s aid societies’ foundational 
raison d’être began to coexist with –and sometimes 
fuelled– two emerging features, namely an increas-
ing militarism that would lead to the revision of the 
Geneva Convention at The Hague (1898) as well as 
to the massacre of the First World War –a line not 
dealt with in this dossier– and growing pressure to 
intervene not only in international wars, but in the 
powers’ expansionist endeavours to conquest, colo-
nise, and hold territories all around the world. In this 
way, war, empire, science and progress became the 
interlocking forces that conditioned the rise of war 
humanitarianism. The practical translation of the 
unsolved debate over national Red Cross societies’ 
role in peacetime and the extent to which it was a 
response to military needs in the colonies of the im-
perial powers is one of the less studied aspects in the 
history of the Red Cross. This is the subject of Leo van 
Bergen’s article, “On ‘war task’ and ‘peace work’: The 
Dutch East Indies Red Cross between colonial wars 
and the Second World War”.
Van Bergen focuses on the activities of the Dutch 
East Indies Red Cross (DEIRC) in the period between 
the end of the Aceh colonial wars (1873-1907) and 
the beginning of the Second World War, as well as on 
the debates over the peacetime role of the Dutch Red 
Cross (DRC) in the Dutch colony that in 1945 became 
modern Indonesia. As Van Bergen demonstrates, after 
having operated in the Aceh colonial wars in the serv-
ice of the Dutch army, the DEIRC became more auton-
omous after 1922 when it entered the League of Red 
Cross Societies –founded in Paris in 1919 with the mis-
sion of coordinating relief assistance in emergency cir-
cumstances beyond warlike conflicts, mostly natural 
disasters and epidemics. The DEIRC’s most important 
peacetime activities during the 1920s and 1930s were 
focused on preparations in case of war –Japanese ex-
pansionism having been perceived as the main threat 
and Japan’s armed invasion of Manchuria in 1931 hav-
ing become the trigger of a serious alarm– even when 
the Red Cross propaganda made great effort to hide 
this in order to win the civil population’s sympathy in 
the face of radical pacifists. During the 1920s it be-
gan to develop new peacetime activities such as so-
cial work in policlinics (mainly in the bigger cities like 
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Batavia [Yakarta] and Buitenzorg [Bogor]) and finan-
cial support to other Red Cross organisations (soon 
interrupted as a result of the economic crisis). Yet, the 
DEIRC flourished most in the 1930s, despite the fact 
that its peacetime activities gradually moved through-
out this decade to preparations for war. Last but not 
least, the DEIRC’s mobilisation was burdened by the 
prevailing European imaginary of the Red Cross move-
ment, one which fuelled a fatalist image of the natives 
whose “Eastern character” allegedly prevented them 
from getting involved in practical tasks, as well as by 
a lack of commitment amongst European residents in 
the Dutch East Indies, who were deemed deficient in 
“a character of national or local patriotism”.
To some extent, the situation described by Van Ber-
gen arose from the fact that, increasingly, European 
war humanitarianism required a previous declaration 
of a “state of war” for its right of intervention. This in 
turn rested upon an elucidation of whether the con-
tenders fitted the conditions for being declared bel-
ligerents. War was recognised as such only when the 
sides recognised this condition in each other or when 
judged accordingly by the European powers. This ex-
plains the absence of the aid societies’ international 
involvement in civil and colonial wars. Moreover, 
this was reinforced by the fact that the international 
movement only recognised one society per nation 
and only included those nations deemed sufficiently 
“civilised”. Until well after the Second World War, this 
conditioned the prevailing view of conflicts in the 
colonies whereby the belligerent status of the insur-
gents was not recognised and non-intervention was 
justified in wars against “barbarian peoples”. As John 
Stuart Mill had once proclaimed:
 “There is a great difference (for example) between the 
case in which the nations concerned are of the same, 
or something like the same, degree of civilization, and 
that in which one of the parties to the situation is of a 
high, and the other of a very low, grade of social im-
provement. To suppose that the same international 
customs, and the same rules of international morality, 
can obtain between one civilized nation and another, 
and between civilized nations and barbarians, is a grave 
error, and one which no statesman can fall into, how-
ever it may be with those who, from a safe and unre-
sponsible position, criticise statesmen. Among many 
reasons why the same rules cannot be applicable to 
situations so different, the two following are among the 
most important. In the first place, the rules of ordinary 
international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians 
will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for 
observing any rules. Their minds are not capable of so 
great an effort, nor their will sufficiently under the in-
fluence of distant motives. In the next place, nations 
which are still barbarous have not got beyond the pe-
riod during which it is likely to be for their benefit that 
they should be conquered and held in subjection by 
foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential 
to the due growth and development of a people fur-
ther advanced in improvement, are generally impedi-
ments to theirs. The sacred duties which civilized na-
tions owe to the independence and nationality of each 
other, are not binding towards those to whom nation-
ality and independence are either a certain evil, or at 
best a questionable good.”12
War humanitarianism and its relationship with 
race, empire and understandings of civilisation are 
also examined in the final contribution to this dossi-
er. This article analyses the kind of problems faced by 
a political regime governing a territory where its au-
thority was being both disputed internally and exter-
nally and where its protectorate wanted to establish 
its own aid society. In this case, where an insurgency 
set itself up as an entity defending a self-proclaimed 
sovereignty, what chance had it to found an aid socie-
ty that was recognised by the international Red Cross 
movement? Remarkably, Francisco Javier Martínez-
Antonio’s article –“Resilient modernisation: the Red 
Cross and Moroccan Agency from Hassan I to the Rif 
Republic, 1886-1926”– shows the room for dispute 
that existed over moral autonomy and the right to 
sovereignty depending on the degree of civilisation. 
Specifically, he analyses how the Red Cross interna-
tional movement in Geneva received the claims by 
the Riffian leader Abdelkrim to establish a Red Cross/
Crescent society in the self-proclaimed Republic of 
Rif as well as the paradoxical distance between the 
efforts to exercise a colonial humanitarianism by the 
Spanish and French Red Cross societies, and the Rif-
fian endeavour also to be accepted in the concert of 
“civilised” nations by means of a compromise with 
war humanitarianism.
* * *
This dossier has its origins in the international 
seminar “War, humanitarianism, progress, home-
land, colonies …: Vicissitudes in the movement of Red 
Cross societies between 1863 and 1927”, held in the 
Residència d’Investigadors (CSIC-Generalitat de Cat-
alunya) at Barcelona in June 2013 under the auspices 
of the research project “Sanidad militar, medicina de 
guerra y humanitarismo en la España del siglo XIX” 
(HAR2011-24134), funded by the Spanish Govern-
ment. I would like to thank its contributors for their 
participation as well as for having made possible with 
their support and encouragement the completion of 
this special edition. I am especially indebted to Guill-
ermo Sánchez-Martínez and Rebecca Gill for their 
inestimable help in preparing this introduction. Last 
but not least, our thanks to Anne-Louise Oakes for her 
most valuable linguistic assistance. 
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NOTES
1 Van Bergen (1994, 2004), Moorehead (1999), Taithe (1999), 
Bennett (2005), Forsythe (2005), Festa (2010), Barnett (2011), 
Eckart (2011), Gill (2013), and Lathion (2013), among others.
2 “It has been urged that instead of seeking for expedients where-
by war may be rendered less terrible, it would be preferable to 
attack the evil at its root, and labour to promote the universal 
and permanent pacification of the world. Our opponents, by 
their arguments, would seem to insinuate that our efforts have 
no higher aim than to legalise war, by making it appear as a 
necessary evil. Is this criticism seriously made? I cannot believe 
it. Most assuredly we desire as much as any one can that men 
should cease to slay each other, and repudiate this relic of bar-
barism which they have inherited from their fathers; with the 
aid of Christianity, this result will sooner or later be attained, 
and we applaud the efforts of those who are striving for the sof-
tening of manners. Yet, in our opinion it will be necessary still for 
longtime to count on human passions and to suffer their deadly 
effects. Therefore, if all they cannot be entirely and immediately 
prevented, why do we not to try to reduce them? Charity asks 
us for it, and that is because we have heard his voice that we are 
here” (Gustave Moynier in CIARC, 1863, p. 8).
3 As suggested by one participant at this conference, the devel-
opment of armament technology was already perceived at the 
time as fuelling a “reckless tendency, a strange optimism that 
leads us to believe that these means with which we expect to 
completely floor the enemy, will not have any action on us” 
(Nicasio Landa in CIARC, 1863, p. 41).
4 Austria, for instance, after having first rejected the call to 
strengthen its aid societies and considering it unnecessary to 
subscribe to the Geneva Convention by stating that its military 
health services and means for transferring the wounded were 
sufficient, eventually signed it on 21 July 1866 as soon as it be-
gan to lose the war with Prussia. The same had occurred in pre-
vious weeks, as a result of the outbreak of the war, by the states 
supporting Austria, namely Bavaria and Württemberg –whose 
signature was still to be ratified– as well as Russia. And the Papal 
States, which were reluctant to accept any declaration close to 
recognising man’s rights, adhered to the Geneva Convention in 
1867, when their military resistance to Italian unification was 
being defeated.
5 A preliminary analysis of the Red Cross model as based upon 
two technologies, namely one health-care technology and an-
other law technology was offered at the paper by Guillermo 
Sánchez-Martínez, Jon Arrizabalaga and J. Carlos García Reyes, 
“Red Cross’ first design and its displacements in the Spanish civil 
wars of the 1870s”, presented in the Annual Meeting of the So-
ciety for Social Studies of Science, held at Copenhagen on 17-20 
October 2012.
6 “The American Association for the Relief of the Misery of Battle 
Fields”, promoted by Henry W. Bellows, Elisha Harris and Theo-
dore Roosevelt Sr., among others, had this as its specific aim.
7 This issue has not been specifically studied so far.
8 This is developed further in Gill (2013).
9 See Sánchez Martínez (et al., 2014).
10 On the French case, see Chrastil (2008).
11 Moynier (1882), p. 230 ; “Le plus grand bienfait à la guerre est 
la fin rapide de la guerre. Il faut pouvoir disposer, à cet effet, 
de tous les moyens qui ne sont pas absolument abominables”. 
Letter by General Von Moltke to the lawyer J. C. Bluntschli, 11 
December 1880. See Revue de droit international et de législa-
tion comparée, 13 (1881), p. 81.
12 Mill (1859), p. 772.
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